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1. IntroductionWorkers who lose their jobs can become re-employed either by being recalled to their previous
employers or by finding new jobs. Temporary layoff unemployment can be defined as unemployment
spells that end with the unemployed person being rehired by the same employer. Around one-third of
unemployed workers have been estimated to be on temporary layoff in the United States and Canada
(OECD, 2002, pp. 218).1 Although underestimated by previous studies,2 recent work has found
temporary layoff to be prevalent also in Europe. Of all terminations of unemployment spells,
temporary layoffs have been estimated to account for more than a third in Austria (Winter-Ebmer,
1998), Norway (Røed and Nordberg, 2003), and Denmark (Jensen and Svarer, 2003). For Germany,
Mavromaras and Rudolph (1998) show that temporary layoffs account for 17% of jobs started by
benefit recipients. Much less evidence exists for the presence of temporary layoffs in Spain. The
possibility of exiting unemployment through recall has been ignored in the analysis of employment
transitions in Spain, mainly due to lack of adequate data.
Against this background, one of the motivations of this paper is to document that recall by the
previous employer is a relevant outcome for transitions out of unemployment in Spain. In our data
set, more than a third of unemployed who find a job return to the previous employer. This finding
needs to be considered in a context in which more than a third of workers hold fixed-term
contracts. When a fixed-term contract ends and a job separation occurs, an implicit agreement
between the worker and the employer may lead to recall. In principle, neither part is committed to
re-initiate the employment relation at a future date. However, absence of experience rating in the
unemployment insurance system can create incentives for employers to offer fixed-term instead
of permanent contracts, as the end of the contract gives the employer employment flexibility and
leaves open the possibility of future recall.
A second motivation for the present study is to contribute to the literature exploring the driving
forces behind the duration pattern of recall unemployment spells. As compared to the large body
of empirical work on labour market outcomes of searching for a new job, there are fewer studies
addressing the outcome of return to the previous employer. Once its empirical prevalence has
been assessed, temporary layoff can be approached from two theoretical perspectives.3 One
follows the implicit contract theory (Feldstein, 1976, 1978; Baily, 1977); the other is based on the
job search theory (Mortensen, 1990). In the implicit contract theory, firm's incentives play a key
role in the intensity and timing of recalls, since they tend to layoff workers on temporary bases in
response to a decline in product demand. Therefore, temporary layoffs result from fluctuations of
the demand for the product, and reflect high attachment of the worker to the firm.
In the job search theory, search effort is predicted to be smaller amongworkers on temporary layoff
than among other unemployedworkers. Given that a worker's productivity tends to decline with time
1 Previous studies also found strong evidence of temporary layoff in Canada and the USA. Robertson (1989)
documents that more than 50% of total unemployment spells in Canada are terminated because the worker returns to the
previous employer; and Katz and Meyer (1990) report that 57% of all unemployment spells in their data sample from
Missouri and Pennsylvania (USA) are temporary layoffs.
2 Earlier studies have suggested that tighter regulatory impediments to the recruitment and dismissal of employees were
responsible for a lower incidence of temporary layoff in Europe (e.g., Moy and Sorrentino, 1981; Gutierrez-Rieger and
Podzeczeck, 1981; for legal restraints on layoff in general, see Emerson, 1988).
3 These two approaches are compatible with many other conditions that provide incentives for firms to layoff workers
temporarily: 1) An imperfectly experience-rated unemployment insurance system; 2) Workers' possession of specific
human capital and its high cost of acquisition; 3) The difficulties and costs associated with recruitment in the open
market; 4) Uncertainties about the quality of the job match that will be achieved with newly recruited employees, etc.
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out of work, a likely search strategy for a worker that expects to be recalled is to reduce recall waiting
and putmore effort into searching for a new job as unemployment duration lengthens. This behavior is
consistent with the finding of significant differences between the effects of the explanatory variables
on the recall hazard rate and the new job hazard rate (Corak, 1996;Katz, 1986; Jensen andWestergärd-
Nielsen, 1990; Jensen and Nielsen, 1999; Rosholm and Svarer, 2001; Røed and Nordberg, 2003).
In this article, we use a discrete-time duration model with competing risks of exits to
investigate the observed and unobserved factors that influence the probabilities of leaving
unemployment to return to the same employer or to find a new job with a different employer. We
focus on involuntary, firm-initiated job separations. By considering these two alternatives for
exiting unemployment, we are able to shed new light on the determinants of transitions from
unemployment to employment in Spain. In addition, we make an empirical contribution to the
growing literature that shares the methodology of distinguishing two alternative routes for leaving
unemployment. The database used comes from Social Security records, and contains information
on all employment (and unemployment) spells of workers in the Spanish labour market over a
three-year period –from June 1999 to June 2002.
We obtain numerous empirical results which are consistent with those of previous studies for
other countries. We find that recall and new job outcomes are associated with different individual
and job characteristics. In particular, as unemployment duration lengthens, the new job finding
hazard rate remains relatively high, while the recall hazard rate falls and becomes minuscule. This
result suggests that, as workers become less confident about being recalled by the previous
employer, they increase their search for a new job, which turns out to be their route for escaping
unemployment (Katz and Meyer, 1990). Another possible interpretation of this result could be
based on the nature of the implicit agreement between the firm and the worker to reinitiate the
employment relationship after some time has passed. Among recalled workers, we do not observe
too long periods of separations because neither side is interested in risking acquired specific
human capital, which is so valuable to the firm.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section two describes the data and the sample. In
Section 3, we specify the discrete-time hazard model with competing risks for modelling the
transitions from unemployment to employment through recall or a different employer. Section 4
provides the estimation results. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in the last section.
2. The data and sample
This paper uses data from Social Security records that contain information on all employment
(and non-employment) spells of workers in the Spanish labour market from June 1999 to June
2002. The data set includes information on age, gender, qualification level,4 dates of start and end
of employment spells, reason for termination of the spell (voluntary/involuntary or retirement),
province of residence of the worker, an identifier of whether each employment spell is
accomplished through a temporary help agency (THA) or not, the type of contract held by the
worker (temporary or permanent), and firm size. This data set was matched with HSIPRE
(Histórico del Sistema Integrado de Prestaciones), another administrative data set that provides
4 The qualification level indicates a position in a ranking determined by the worker's contribution to the Social Security
system. It is somewhat related to the individual's qualification level, since it reflects the worker's professional category
and salary. It could happen, however, that a worker with higher education is far below the category that would correspond
to his formal education (see appendix Table A.1).
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information on the last ten spells of unemployment benefits received by each worker.5 Thus, we
know whether each individual was receiving unemployment benefits when out of work, the type
of benefits received (of contributory or assistance type), the number of days granted for benefit
and the number of days of benefit receipt.
The advantage of using Social Security records for the analysis of flows in and out of
unemployment is threefold: (i) The availability of information on all jobs held by the individual
during a certain interval of time; (ii) unemployment duration is very accurate and detailed; (iii) it
is possible to distinguish spells ending through recall from those ending through the finding of a
new job. In addition, the combination with data from the unemployment benefits receipt allows us
to overcome many of the limitations of studies that use data from either Social Security records or
the HSIPRE.6 An advantage of the dataset is that information is available on the entire spell of
non-employment, and a limitation is that it contains the complete work history of individuals over
a rather short period (from June 1999 to June 2002).
Since each establishment is given its identification code in each province it operates, our database
contains an anonymous identification number for the employer associated with every single spell of
employment. Thus, temporary separations are identified by whether or not each firm's identification
numbers of two subsequent employment spells coincide. It is noteworthy that we only refer to
temporary layoffs in an ex post sense – i.e., job separations ending in recall. We have no information
on ex ante temporary layoffs–i.e., those that beginwith a person expecting to be recalled. Thus, the ex
postmeasure is likely to underestimate the total amount of unemployment affected by recall prospects,
since it does not include the unemployment of those who initially waited for recall but were not
recalled. In any case, this ex post concept gives the proportion of unemployment from spells involving
no job change (Feldstein, 1975; Clark and Summers, 1979), and it is not ambiguous in the sense that it
is not based on whether individuals decided what is a new employer and what is not.7
The data contains an initial sample of 79,267 representative cases drawn from workers who
were subject to Social Security contributions and become jobless at some point in time during the
first semester of 2000. We drop individuals who do not meet all the following criteria: 1) Entered
unemployment due to involuntary reasons –i.e., dismissals or termination of temporary
contracts.8 As we consider only the first spell of unemployment occurring in the indicated period,
5 Therefore, our data is composed of two different random samples for the Spanish labour market: (i) 2.5% of
individuals who were either employed or receiving unemployment insurance benefits in June of 2002; (ii) 2.5% of
individuals who were registered at the employment office in June of 2002 without receiving any unemployment benefits.
This second sample was extracted in order not to exclude from our analysis the individuals who did not appear at the time
of selecting the sample (June of 2002) from Social Security records.
6 A different extraction from Social Security records was previously used to study employment and unemployment
spells through the use of duration models in García-Fontes and Hopenhayn (1996), García-Pérez (1997), and García-
Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2005a,b), but they only have data up to the year 1999. On the other hand, Cebrián et al. (1996),
Arranz and Muro (2004) and Jenkins and García-Serrano (2004) have used HSIPRE.
7 The wide use of temporary employment in the Spanish labour market advises us against the use of the term
“temporary layoff” in connection with recall activity by firms. For this reason, we analyse unemployment duration paying
more attention on how the unemployment spell ends than on how it was initiated. More specifically, a great majority of
workers in Spain become unemployed because of end of their contracts. We understand that end of contract is not exactly
the same thing as layoff. By contracting with fixed-term contracts, firms have no need for temporary layoffs. Workers
with permanent contracts are expensive to dismiss, so when they are laid-off they are unlikely to come back or to be
called back. Because of these considerations, when we use the term layoff it has to be understood that separations because
of expiration of contracts are also included.
8 We cannot distinguish between these two reasons for job termination. Workers who quit their jobs (end their
employment for voluntary reasons) are not considered in this study because we do not know why this happens and these
workers are likely to leave the labour force (see García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2005b).
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we obtain a “flow sample” of unemployed workers in the terminology of Lancaster (1990), pp.
162; 2) In the previous job, the individual was registered with the General System of Social
Security9; 3) We have complete information on all the variables used in the empirical analysis; 4)
Workers must remain out of work for more than 30 days. We eliminate workers with
unemployment spells lasting 30 days or less because they experiment straight movements from
job to job without experiencing unemployment. Finally, we limit our sample to workers aged
between 16 and 62 (to avoid complications associated with early retirement).
After applying the indicated sample selections, we obtain a final sample of 23,035 individuals.
Table A.2 of the Appendix shows the loss of observations from the initial dataset. In the sample,
each of those individuals has been followed from the date when they become unemployed in the
first semester of the year 2000 until their re-employment occurs. Those still without a job in June
2002 have been treated as right-censored observations.10 Main variable definitions and basic
descriptive statistics for the sample used in the empirical analysis are given in Table 1.
As it is shown in Table 1, 36% of unemployed who find a job return to the firm where they
were previously employed (8,277 over 23,035 individuals). Therefore, recalls do constitute,
indeed, an important element of unemployment in Spain. This figure is even higher than the one
found in other European countries.11 We also see that recall is more concentrated on certain
individuals. In particular, males are less likely to return to their previous employer when exiting
from unemployment (66 percent of recalled individuals are women as opposed to 44 percent
among non-recalled individuals). Moreover, age appears as another relevant determinant of being
recalled: the recall outcome is slightly more important for individuals aged 35 and over. And
individuals in possession of either low or low-intermediate qualification levels tend to experiment
a relatively higher recall outcome. Moreover, on average, recalls seem to be more concentrated on
workers with shorter unemployment spells, shorter employment duration and slightly higher
number of previous jobs.12
According to the results from a multivariate logit model13 (not shown) the probability that a
given unemployed person becomes recalled to his or her previous employer, rather than becoming
employed in a new job, is more likely to be associated with the following characteristics: women,
older than 39 – a fact which is consistent with the view of firms trying to maintain their eldest
employees' specific human capital - either high or low skilled - although this effect of
qualification only remains significant for men–, held a non permanent contract, worked in a
relatively short period of time in firms with more than 200 employees, spent less time
9 Because specific regimes like Farming and Self-employment have different rules for accessing benefits and the
peculiarities of their employment relationships, they should be object of separate analysis.
10 We have also created an artificial right censoring for observations of workers whose unemployment spell duration12 In addition, cross tabulations of various individual characteristics with these data not shown, but available from the
authors upon request- clearly show that exit from unemployment through recall is particularly high for low skilled women
(48.2%) and for women 55 and older (70.8%). Unemployment duration is negatively related to recall intensity: 21.5% of
women unemployed for more than a year as compared with 48.3% of women unemployed for less than 20 weeks are
recalled. Finally, recall tends to be more common among individuals in the tails of the qualification distribution.
13 Distinguishing between workers who found a new job and workers who were recalled, we performed a logit
regression for the entire sample and by gender. The personal characteristics used as independent variables were gender,
age, qualification level, the type of contract in the previous job, the number of employees in the previous employer,
tenure in the previous job, unemployment duration, whether or not the previous employer was a temporary help agency,
whether or not the individual receive unemployment benefits (either contributory or assistance), the number of previous
jobs, and the regional unemployment rate.
extends beyond 19 months.
11 For instance, Germany see Mavromaras and Rudolph (1998) or Mavromaras and Orme (2004).
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Table 1
Main descriptive statistics for first unemployment spell in 2000
Variable Description Entire sample
Mean (S.D.)
Recall
Mean (S.D.)
New Job
Mean (S.D.)
Gender 1 if male 0.517 0.436 0.562
Age Age in years when entering unemployment
16-19 1 if aged 16 to 19 0.071 0.043 0.087
20-24 1 if aged 20 to 24 0.218 0.166 0.246
25-29 1 if aged 25 to 29 0.206 0.176 0.223
30-34 1 if aged 30 to 34 0.152 0.158 0.149
35-39 1 if aged 35 to 39 0.122 0.147 0.109
40-44 1 if aged 40 to 44 0.092 0.122 0.076
45-49 1 if aged 45 to 49 0.064 0.086 0.052
50-54 1 if aged 50 to 54 0.046 0.061 0.037
55-59 1 if aged 55 to 59 0.023 0.032 0.019
59-62 1 if aged more than 59 years old 0.005 0.009 0.003
Qualification level(⁎)
High 1 if Social Security bracket for
contribution in previous job is 1, 2 or 3.
0.083 0.099 0.073
Upper-intermediate 1 if Social Security bracket for
contribution in previous job is 4, 5 or 6
0.111 0.097 0.119
Lower-intermediate 1 if Social Security bracket for
contribution in previous job is 7 or 8
0.289 0.244 0.314
Low 1 if Social Security bracket for
contribution in previous job is 9 or 10
0.517 0.559 0.494
Type of contract Type of contract in previous job
Permanent 1 if permanent contract 0.069 0.029 0.091
Permanent per task 1 if permanent per task contract 0.036 0.084 0.012
Temporary 1 if temporary contract 0.849 0.825 0.863
Other contract type 1 if other contract type 0.044 0.062 0.034
Temporary help agency 1 if previously employed through a THA 0.052 0.036 0.061
Firm size
b 10 employees 1 if number of employees up to 10 0.343 0.290 0.372
N10 and b 50 1 if number of employees
above 10 and up to 50
0.294 0.297 0.293
N50 and b 200 1 if number of employees
above 50 and up to 200
0.186 0.200 0.179
N200 and b 1000 1 if number of employees
above 200 and up to 1000
0.120 0.135 0.111
N1000 1 if number of employees above 1000 0.057 0.077 0.045
Tenure in previous job Tenure in previous job (in weeks) 32.788
(80.555)
23.130
(32.611)
38.154
(97.073)
b 4 1 if up to 4 weeks 0.255 0.298 0.232
N4 and b 20 1 if above 4 weeks and up to 20 weeks 0.308 0.273 0.327
N20 and b 1 year 1 if above 20 weeks and up to 1 year 0.311 0.356 0.286
N1 and b 2 years 1 if above 1 year and up to 2 years 0.076 0.051 0.090
N2 years 1 if above 2 years 0.049 0.021 0.064
Worked in a Temporary
Help Agency
1 if worked in a THA in previous job 0.052 0.036 0.061
Unemployment benefit status
Contributory benefit Proportion collecting contributory benefits
at the beginning of spell ( 1 for each month
worker collects benefits)
0.2230 0.1718 0.2515
(continued on next page)
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unemployed, received unemployment benefits of shorter duration and experienced more job
changes.
Table 1 (continued )
Variable Description Entire sample
Mean (S.D.)
Recall
Mean (S.D.)
New Job
Mean (S.D.)
Assistance benefit Proportion collecting assistance
benefits at the beginning of spell
( 1 for each month worker collects benefits)
0.0538 0.0524 0.0546
Without benefit Proportion without benefits at the beginning
of spell ( 1 for each month worker collects
no benefits)
0.7232 0.7759 0.6939
Number of previous
jobs
Number of jobs held from June 1999 to actual job 2.111
(1.740)
2.266
(1.860)
2.026
(1.663)
Unemployment
duration
Duration in unemployment (in weeks) 25.853
(22.154)
22.264
(19.782)
27.846
(23.129)
N4 and b 20 1 if Above 4 weeks and up to 20 weeks 0.577 0.652 0.535
N20 and b 1 year 1 if Above 20 weeks and up to 1 year 0.281 0.251 0.298
N1 year 1 if Above 1 year 0.142 0.097 0.167
Sector of activity:
Industry 1 if previous employment in industry 0.132 0.135 0.130
Agriculture 1 if previous employment in agriculture 0.005 0.005 0.005
Construction 1 if previous employment in construction 0.165 0.147 0.175
Services 1 if previous employment in services 0.698 0.713 0.689
Sample size 23,035 8,227 14,808
Notes: (⁎) See Appendix for the exact meaning of each of the 10 category contribution groups. We must underscore that the
ten professional categories of worker contribution to Social Security in the database do not reveal the workers' level of
qualification, but rather the required level of qualification for the job. For instance, an individual working in the lowest
category, “labourers”, may well be in possession of an academic degree. As in previous studies using data from the Social
Security records, we group those eleven categories into four groups (see García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2005a,b).3. Econometric approach: a competing risks duration analysis
For the empirical analysis, we specify a discrete-time duration model with competing risks of
exits following the formulation proposed by Allison (1982). This same econometric framework
has been used by Jenkins (1995), Alba-Ramirez (1998), Steiner (2001), Lauer (2003), and D'
Addio and Rosholm (2005), among others. This type of models is common in the analysis of
temporary layoffs where all the unemployed are subject to the competing risks of a recall and a
new job (Katz, 1986; Røed and Nordberg, 2003).14 An advantage of the competing risks model is
that we can obtain a neat result for the re-employment probability because we estimate the
discrete-time hazard model simultaneously for the two kinds of exists from unemployment.
In a discrete-time duration model with competing risks, an individual's unemployment spell is
represented by a random variable T, which can take on positive integer values only. We observe a total
ofn independent individuals (I=1,…,n) beginning at some natural starting point t=1. In the data used in
14 A problem when estimating single risk duration models is the potential aggregation bias. Unemployed typically leave
unemployment for different reasons (competing risks). Restricting the estimated coefficients for the baseline hazard and
the covariates to be the same for all destination states might therefore be a very restrictive assumption. Therefore, the
econometric model for the sequence of discrete choice models is a multinomial logit model or competing risks model; in
each spell, the unemployed can either stay in unemployment (the reference category), be re-employed though a different
employer or be re-employed though the same employer.
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this paper, such point is the month when the worker becomes unemployed for the first time during the
first semester of the year 2000. Each observation continues until time t, at which point an event occurs
or the observation is censored. The unemployment spell can end, T=t, in any of j states: j=1 (re-
employment through a new job) or j=2 (re-employment through the same employer as the
immediately previous one; that is, a recall takes place). The observation is censored when the surviving
individual is observed at month t but not at month t+1. It is assumed that the time of censoring is
independent of the hazard rate for the occurrence of events, at least after controlling for other factors.
Also, it is assumed that the set of two states at which unemployment spells end is absorbing and equal
for each person.
For modelling the transition from unemployment to employment through recall or a different
employer, we define the discrete hazard rate. For the i th person, the hazard rate into state j
( j=1,2) in period t, hij(t), is the conditional probability of a transition to state j in this period,
given that individual i has been unemployed until t.15
hijðtÞ ¼ Pr½Ti ¼ ti; J ¼ jjTiN ¼ ti ð1Þ
Assuming that the competing risks are independent, the hazard rate from unemployment is
given by:
hiðtÞ ¼
X2
j¼1
hijðtÞ ð2Þ
Assuming that all spell observations are independent, the likelihood function for the original
state j can be written in terms of hazard rates as follows:
L ¼ j
n
i¼1
j
2
j¼1
hijðtÞ
1−hijðtÞ
 dij
j
t
k¼1
ð1−hikÞ
 " #
ð3Þ
In this expression, the indicator function δij, equals one if the duration is complete (individual i
makes a transition to state j), and equals zero if duration is censored. Therefore, the first
component of (3) captures the transition rate and the second component is the survivor function
which represents the conditional probability that individual i remains unemployed in period t.
Given that (3) is in function of the transition rates, we just need to specify the dependence of the
latter on a set of explanatory variables. For the hazard rate we choose the logistic specification that,
with multiple events, generates the multinomial logitmodel (Maddala, 1983). It allows for the three
possible states considered: employment through a different employer; employment through recall;
and remaining unemployed (which is the reference state category). For individual i, the transition
rate to state j in period t specified as a multinomial logit can be written as (Steiner, 2001, pp. 96):
hj tjz tð Þ; ej
  ¼ expðD VðtÞaj þ Z VðtÞbjVþ ejÞ
1þ P2
m¼1
expðD VðtÞam þ Z VðtÞbm þ emÞ
ð4Þ
where Z(t) is a vector of explanatory variables which may vary with time; β is the vector of
parameters to be estimated; the terms α stands for the baseline hazard which captures the duration
15 According to the simple job search model (Lippman and MacCall, 1976), given a stationary reservation wage, the re-
employment probability is the result of two probabilities: the rate at which offers arrive times the probability that a
random offer is accepted. In our competing risks model, unemployed workers can either obtain a job through a different
employer from the immediately previous one or be re-employed through recall to the previous employer.
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dependence.16 The specification of the baseline hazard is very important. A common but restrictive
approach consists of specifying a parametric form for the baseline hazard. This approach is very
strong because the assumptions over the form are difficult to justify from an economic point of view,
and provokes a misspecification problem. Instead, we choose a semi-parametric approach
(piecewise constant hazard) by specifying monthly dummies D(t) which coefficients for transitions
to employment through recall can differ from those for transitions to employment through a different
employer. This method presents the advantage of being flexible and assumes that the duration
dependence pattern may vary among the states. Finally, since failing to control for unobserved
heterogeneity in hazardmodels tends to create spurious negative duration dependence in the baseline
hazard out of unemployment (Lancaster, 1979, 1990), in our analysis ε accounts for unobserved
heterogeneity characteristics in the model such as motivation, ability, effort, family pressure, etc.We
assume that the unobserved heterogeneity effect is destination state specific, time constant, and
independent of the observed characteristics.17
The contribution to the likelihood function for a single individual is equal to (D' Addio and
Rosholm, 2005, pp. 454):
L b; ajeð Þ ¼ j
t
k¼1
exp½ðDkVa1 þ ZkVb1 þ e1Þc1k þ ðDkVa2 þ ZkVb2 þ e2Þc2k 
1þ P2
m¼1
expðDkVam þ ZkVbm þ emÞ
ð5Þ
where cjk are indicators for making the transition to each of the possible destination states at time k; re-
employment through a different employer from the immediately previous one (j=1), or re-
employment though the same employer as the immediately previous one (j=2).Unemployment spells
that are still in progress at the end of the observation period are treated as right censored observations.
For these observations, both destination indicators are 0, and thus, the contribution to the likelihood
function is the probability of remaining unemployed for at least the observed sample period. In (5) a
common procedure is to specify a parametric distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity such as a
normal, gamma distribution, etc. However, given that the unobserved heterogeneity distribution is
unknown, Heckman and Singer (1984) have criticised this approach, showing that parametric form
assumptions for unobserved heterogeneity might be biased when the chosen distribution for the
unobservable term is incorrect. For this reason, they resolve this problemby assuming that unobserved
heterogeneity is discretely distributedwith unknown support points. Those points can be interpreted as
latent individual's types. Then, the likelihood function for an individual may be obtained by
integrating the following conditional likelihood distribution:
Lðb; a; e; pÞ ¼ j
S
s¼1
Lðb; aje ¼ sÞpðsÞ ð6Þ
16 The explanatory variables used in the analysis are the ones described in Table 1.
17 This is a standard assumption in duration models (D' Addio and Rosholm, 2005; Jenkins, 1995; Rosholm and Svarer,
2001; Steiner, 2001). If this assumption is violated, maximum likelihood estimates will be biased by endogeneity. That is,
the estimated β coefficients will pick up some of the effects of the unobservable characteristics, ε. If we relax the
assumption and ε is correlated with Z, then the probability of exiting from unemployment through a new job or by recall
will be affected, and a test for endogeneity will be required. As proposed by Heckman and Borjas (1980) and
Chamberlain (1985), the identification in such models relies in the specification in terms of leads and lags of all the time
varying covariates such that their lagged values can be used as instruments for the variables that may be suspected of
endogeneity. This is only practical if there is sufficient variation over time in regressors. However, identification of a
model where a test for endogeneity could be implemented results infeasible due to the short span of our sample period
(see, in this respect, D' Addio and Rosholm, 2005, pp. 454).
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Where ε are the location points (that can be interpreted as intercept for the baseline hazard
function), π the probability associated to them, and s the number of support points.18Before proceeding with the estimation we have performed some tests for the assumption of
‘independence of irrelevant alternatives' (IIA) through the Hausman test (Hausman and
McFadden, 1984, HM) and Small Hsiao test (Small and Hsiao, 1985, SH). Those popular tests for
testing the validity of IIA consist of partitioning the choice set of alternatives into subsets and
therefore comparing the coefficients (HM) or the likelihood functions (SH) from the complete
model and from the restricted model obtained by leaving out one or more alternatives. In both
tests, results in Table 2 tell us that the null hypothesis of IIA is accepted; therefore, the
multinomial logit specification seems to be appropriate for each departure state.
In addition, the results of a Wald test and a LR test are also reported in Table 2. This is done in
order to examine the null hypothesis that the coefficients of two categories do not differ
significantly from each other, for all the possible combinations. In other words, that some of the
alternatives might be combined or aggregated into a simple category, in which case the
specification should be binomial rather than a multinomial. In both tests the rejection of the null
hypothesis means that it is adequate to distinguish between exits into a new job and into recall.
Thus, the multinomial specification for the model seems to be appropriate, since none of the
categories should be combined.
4. Estimation results
Estimation results are presented in Table 3 for the entire sample (men and women), in Table 4
for men and in Table 5 for women. Two single risk estimations have been obtained based on the
likelihood function (6) by the maximum likelihood estimator. The first column reports estimated
coefficients for exit from unemployment to a new job and the second column reports estimated
coefficients for exit from unemployment through recall. Note that the exponential function of the
parameter of a dummy variable measures the hazard rate for an individual with the dummy equal
to one relative to the reference person.
Given that both support points are highly significant in all the estimations, exit rates from
unemployment to a new job or recall are affected not only by measured individual and job
characteristics of the unemployed, but also by their unobserved characteristics. Estimated
coefficients and the value of the log-likelihood are affected by the inclusion of unobserved
heterogeneity. In particular, unobserved heterogeneity increases the log-likelihood values in the
estimations, which indicates an improvement in the fit of the model.19
18 It should be indicated that the econometric approach adopted in this article boils down to estimating a reduced form
model for employment transitions, conditional on a set of individual and job characteristics and on the worker being in a
particular initial state. Other features that make this technique an attractive and flexible one for estimating the effect of
those characteristics on the probability of exit from unemployment are: 1) The consideration of competing risks; 2) The
incorporation of individual specific unobserved heterogeneity; and 3) The fact that no assumptions are made with respect
to the shape of the baseline hazard.
19 A simple likelihood ratio test of a model with unobserved heterogeneity against another without unobserved
heterogeneity confirms the conclusion that unobserved heterogeneity is significant. Thus, the specification with
unobservables is identified in the standard multilogit model which is implicit in the text. The value of the likelihood ratio
test statistic for the entire sample of a model with unobserved heterogeneity against that without is 203.6. This value
exceeds the critical chi square value of 3.84 for 1 d.f. at significance level of 5% and therefore, unobserved heterogeneity
component should be included in the specification of the model. The values of the likelihood ratio test statistic are 47.94
and 118.56 for males and females, respectively. Both values exceeds the critical chi square value (previously mentioned);
therefore, unobserved heterogeneity is also significant in those models.
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According to results in Table 3, men are more likely than women to exit from unemployment
through a new job. The estimated coefficient translates into a probability differential of 44.8 per
cent. On the other hand, men are 7.7 per cent less likely than women to be recalled to the previous
Table 2
Specification tests
Test for IIA χ2(PNχ2)
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives.
Hausman
Omitted: Different employment. 62.652(0.69)
Omitted: Recall job. −18.983(1.00)
Small-Hsiao
Omitted: Different employment 62.661(0.69)
Omitted: Recall job. 62.298(0.70)
Wald and LR test for combining outcomes
Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes are 0
(i.e., categories can be collapsed).
Wald test
Combining different employment and recall job. 2905.035(0.00)
Combining diff. employment and unemployment. 2632.265(0.00)
Combining recall job and unemployment. 4058.603(0.00)
LR test
Combining different employment and recall job. 3308.793(0.00)
Combining diff. employment and unemployment. 2807.516(0.00)
Combining recall job and unemployment. 4371.359(0.00)employer. This implies that women tend to enjoy shorter unemployment duration than men when
they return to the previous employer. However, it takes women longer than men to find a new job.
As regards age, the 35-39 age interval marks the difference: the younger workers are more
likely to find a new job while elder workers are more likely to be recalled. This result for age on
the recall hazard rate is most probably related to the fact that older workers have more firm-
specific human capital, which is an attribute highly valued by the employer. In addition, it is a fact
that younger workers are more willing to move from jobs (and employers) for improving their job
match and eventually settling in a more stable career path (Jensen and Svarer, 2003).
Our data set does not contain variables related to the individual's educational attainment or
occupation. However, it provides information related to the required level of qualification for the
job (see Table A.1 of the Appendix). This allows us to find that workers holding jobs that require
higher qualification levels are more likely to be recalled by their previous employer. On the other
hand, lower qualified workers suffer the greatest difficulties in finding a new job. This result,
combined with that associated with age, fits quite nicely into a variety of theories suggesting that
the accumulation of firm-specific human capital by older workers, the job-shopping behaviour of
younger workers, and the level of qualifications are well explanatory factors of the ways and
probabilities of escaping unemployment for recalled workers (Fischer and Pichelmann, 1991).
One important variable that provides interesting insights into the way workers exit
unemployment in Spain is firm size. Two relevant factors are associated with firm size: the
effectiveness of workers' representatives and the cost of layoffs to the firm. In Spain, firms can
have two types of workers' representatives: the unions (secciones sindicales) and the workers
councils (comités de empresa). Given that the latter are internal bodies formed by employees of
the firm, their existence and effectiveness depend on firm size. In particular, workers councils can
only exist in firms with at least fifty employees, and have gained increasing prestige among
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Table 3
Estimates and standard error of transitions from unemployment to employment through recall or to employment through a
different employer after controlling observed and unobserved heterogeneity (with two support points)
ENTIRE SAMPLE
Dif. Emp Recall
Coef. S.E. Sign. Coef. S.E. Sign.
Gender (male 1) 0.370 0.024 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.080 0.028 ⁎⁎⁎
Age at unemployment spell:
Age 16-19 0.352 0.051 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.545 0.068 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 20-24 0.422 0.040 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.268 0.047 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 25-29 0.271 0.039 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.212 0.046 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 30-34 0.138 0.043 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.109 0.047 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 35-39
Age 40-44 −0.060 0.049 0.137 0.051 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 45-49 −0.106 0.055 ⁎⁎ 0.139 0.056 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 50-54 −0.098 0.062 0.162 0.063 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 55-59 −0.062 0.080 0.151 0.081
Age 59-62 −0.453 0.178 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.401 0.155 ⁎⁎⁎
Qualification level:
Qual. High −0.010 0.051 0.212 0.059 ⁎⁎⁎
Qual. Med.-High
Qual. Medium-Low 0.086 0.037 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.060 0.048
Qual. Low −0.165 0.037 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.043 0.045
Type of contract:
Permanent contract
Permanent per task −0.306 0.094 ⁎⁎⁎ 1.692 0.086 ⁎⁎⁎
Temporary 0.187 0.045 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.731 0.070 ⁎⁎⁎
Other type 0.050 0.070 0.904 0.088 ⁎⁎⁎
Firm size:
b 10 employees
N10 and b 50 employees 0.054 0.027 ⁎⁎ 0.192 0.033 ⁎⁎⁎
N50 and b 200 employees 0.151 0.032 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.393 0.039 ⁎⁎⁎
N200 and b 1000 employees 0.061 0.040 0.517 0.046 ⁎⁎⁎
N1000 employees −0.025 0.058 0.804 0.060 ⁎⁎⁎
Tenure in previous job:
b 4 weeks
N4 weeks and b 20 weeks 0.473 0.033 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.081 0.037 ⁎⁎
N20 weeks and b 1 year 0.602 0.039 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.552 0.041 ⁎⁎⁎
N1 year and b 2 years 0.611 0.050 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.134 0.066 ⁎⁎
N2 years 0.593 0.059 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.245 0.095 ⁎⁎⁎
Worked in a Temporary Help Agency 0.408 0.055 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.061 0.072
Unemployment benefit status:
Receives no benefits
Contributory benefits −0.400 0.041 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.566 −0.058 ⁎⁎⁎
Assistance benefits −0.454 0.055 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.873 0.070 ⁎⁎⁎
Month ⁎ Contributory benefits −0.016 0.008 ⁎ −0.032 0.015 ⁎⁎⁎
Number of previous jobs 0.102 0.007 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.125 0.007 ⁎⁎⁎
(continued on next page)
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workers since the early 1980s.20 In larger firms, therefore, the relevant legislative constraints that
determine the size and effectiveness of the workers councils are considerably more restrictive
with respect to the optimising behaviour of firms (Mavromaras and Rudolph, 1998). Given the
Table 3 (continued )
ENTIRE SAMPLE
Dif. Emp Recall
Coef. S.E. Sign. Coef. S.E. Sign.
Unemployment benefit status:
Regional Unemployment rate (tvc) −0.023 0.009 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.062 0.010 ⁎⁎⁎
Sector of activity:
Industry
Agriculture 0.510 0.153 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.004 0.186
Construction 0.056 0.041 −0.341 0.051 ⁎⁎⁎
Services 0.009 0.034 −0.249 0.040 ⁎⁎⁎
Mass points and probability:
ε1 (s.e.) −4.908(0.243)⁎⁎⁎
ε2 (s.e.) −3.020(0.125)⁎⁎⁎
Pr(ε1) 0.096
Pr(ε2) 0.904
No. Observations 125,044
No. of individuals 23,035
Log-likelihood −68,259
Note: Regression includes controls for 17 regions, unemployment duration (in months) dummies variables (baseline) and
month of entering unemployment. “tvc”means time varying covariate. Source: Social security data base, except for the the
regional unemployment rate, which has been obtained from the Spanish Labour Force Survey, EPA ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates
significance at 1 per cent; ⁎⁎ indicates significance at 5 per cent.costs borne by workers in recalls -in terms of losses in current income, future benefit entitlements
and employment security– councils are expected to effectively minimize layoff durations in larger
firms. Moreover, smaller firms can be expected to experience longer recall durations because
individual workers employed by smaller firms will be less able to influence the timing of such
recall. As firm size increases, there will be more and stronger workers councils with both the
power and the incentive to intervene and assist workers' optimising behaviour. Our results are
consistent with these predictions, for we find that the hazard rate of exiting from unemployment
through recall increases with firm size. For instance, compared to firms with less than 10
employees, the recall hazard rate is 21 per cent higher in firms between 10 and 50 employees and
67 per cent higher in those with 200-1000 employees.
As seasonal downturns in demand and production are easily anticipated by employers, they
may turn to temporary layoffs as an employment adjustment strategy. This expected relationship
between seasonal work and temporary layoff unemployment is captured in our regressions
through the variable type of contract. In particular, the observation that temporary layoff
unemployment serves to accommodate seasonal fluctuations in production is confirmed by the
estimated coefficients for the temporary contract, and, especially, for the permanent per task
contract. Workers under this latter type of contracts enjoy strong links with their previous
20 The available evidence show greater importance of workers councils as workers representatives along time (Jimeno
and Toharia, 1993; Malo, 2005).
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Table 4
Men's transitions from unemployment to employment through recall or to different employer with unobserved
heterogeneity (two support points)
MEN
Dif. Emp Recall
Coef. S.E. Sign. Coef. S.E. Sign.
Age at unemployment spell:
Age 16-19 0.182 0.067 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.708 0.097 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 20-24 0.332 0.056 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.212 0.070 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 25-29 0.197 0.055 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.206 0.069 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 30-34 0.172 0.058 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.108 0.071 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 35-39
Age 40-44 −0.076 0.065 0.034 0.076
Age 45-49 −0.175 0.071 ⁎⁎ 0.024 0.083
Age 50-54 −0.092 0.080 0.084 0.094
Age 55-59 0.009 0.098 0.004 0.119
Age 59-62 −0.382 0.198 ⁎⁎ 0.275 0.210
Qualification level:
Qual. High −0.101 0.075 0.235 0.094 ⁎⁎⁎
Qual. Med.-High
Qual. Medium-Low 0.111 0.057 ⁎⁎ 0.082 0.076
Qual. Low −0.080 0.055 −0.108 0.073
Type of contract:
Permanent contract
Permanent per task −0.428 0.165 ⁎⁎⁎ 1.997 0.145 ⁎⁎⁎
Temporary 0.141 0.063 ⁎⁎ 0.832 0.104 ⁎⁎⁎
Other type 0.041 0.104 0.750 0.144 ⁎⁎⁎
Firm size:
b 10 employees
N10 and b 50 employees 0.095 0.036 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.145 0.047 ⁎⁎⁎
N50 and b 200 employees 0.192 0.044 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.228 0.059 ⁎⁎⁎
N200 and b 1000 employees 0.038 0.056 0.392 0.070 ⁎⁎⁎
N1000 employees −0.043 0.089 0.719 0.101 ⁎⁎⁎
Tenure In previous job:
b 4 weeks
N4 weeks and b 20 weeks 0.501 0.043 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.023 0.054
N20 weeks and b 1 year 0.640 0.049 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.470 0.058 ⁎⁎⁎
N1 year and b 2 years 0.661 0.066 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.253 0.090 ⁎⁎⁎
N2 years 0.578 0.079 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.066 0.124
Worked in a Temporary Help Agency 0.435 0.079 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.014 0.107
Unemployment benefit status:
Receives no benefits
Contributory benefits −0.418 0.054 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.682 0.084 ⁎⁎⁎
Assistance benefits −0.425 0.077 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.989 0.121 ⁎⁎⁎
Month * Contributory benefits −0.023 0.012 ⁎⁎ −0.034 0.021
Number of previous jobs 0.083 0.009 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.099 0.010 ⁎⁎⁎
Regional Unemployment rate (tvc) 0.027 0.012 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.080 0.014 ⁎⁎⁎
(continued on next page)
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employer when they are out of work. This relationship is much stronger than with other types of
contracts, since individuals retain seniority and other employment-related benefits (for instance,
they have the right to return to the same job with the same employer, since they have the privilege
Table 4 (continued )
MEN
Dif. Emp Recall
Coef. S.E. Sign. Coef. S.E. Sign.
Sector of activity:
Industry
Agriculture 0.348 0.185 ⁎ 0.049 −0.257
Construction 0.061 0.049 −0.276 0.066 ⁎⁎⁎
Services −0.082 0.046 ⁎ −0.246 0.059 ⁎⁎⁎
Mass points and probability:
ε1 (s.e.) −4.575(0.316)⁎⁎⁎
ε2 (s.e.) −2.668(0.192)⁎⁎⁎
Pr(ε1) 0.107
Pr(ε2) 0.893
No. Observations 62,136
Log-likelihood −34,961.853
Note: See note Table 3.of being requested first by their previous employer on their availability to re-enter their payroll21).
Given that workers with such contracts are treated as if they had maintained their employment
relationship, they usually do not engage in job-seeking activities because they regard themselves
as employed and they are virtually certain to return to their jobs at the end of the layoff period.
There are several other variables that provide interesting insights into the way workers exit from
unemployment in Spain. In particular, the worker's previous employment history might be an
important explanatory factor of the reemployment probability. In this sense, individuals more
accustomed to move from jobs are supposedly more “employable”, and thus are expected to leave
unemployment earlier. This expectation is confirmed in results obtained for the variable which
measures the number of previous jobs: individuals subject to higher turnover (in terms of the number
of previous jobs held) enjoy a higher escape rate from unemployment.Moreover, havingworked via a
THAenhances 50.4 per cent the probability of finding a new job, while the recall hazard is not affected
by agency work. Compared to individuals who worked in the industry sector, those who worked in
construction or services are significantly less likely to be recalled.Moreover, tenure in the previous job
appears to be an important variable for explaining the exit rate from unemployment. A job that lasted
4 weeks or less is the circumstance that makes it harder for workers to exit from unemployment by
finding a new job. Having held a job that lasted more than two years makes it the hardest to exit
unemployment by being recalled to the previous employer.
The worker's unemployment benefit status is included in the regression as dummies that indicate
whether or not the individual receives contributory or assistance benefits. Regardless of the type of
exit, these two dummies obtain the expected negative sign: non-claimants exit from unemployment
faster than claimants do. Although the disincentive effect of contributory and assistance benefits is
similar in magnitude for unemployed who make a transition to a new job, the impact of each type of
21 In addition, when being laid-off, those individuals receive payments subsidized by the Government (through the UI
system for the time not worked).
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Table 5
Women's transitions from unemployment to employment through recall or to different employer with unobserved
heterogeneity (two support points)
WOMEN
Dif. Emp Recall
Coef. S.E. Sign. Coef. S.E. Sign.
Age at unemployment spell:
Age 16-19 0.568 0.084 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.368 0.100 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 20-24 0.527 0.061 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.287 0.065 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 25-29 0.366 0.061 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.207 0.064 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 30-34 0.124 0.067 ⁎ −0.108 0.066 ⁎
Age 35-39
Age 40-44 −0.036 0.081 −0.218 0.072 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 45-49 0.003 0.091 0.211 0.081 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 50-54 −0.113 0.110 0.224 0.091 ⁎⁎⁎
Age 55-59 −0.263 0.156 ⁎ 0.270 0.119 ⁎⁎
Age 59-62 −0.831 0.462 ⁎ 0.505 0.249 ⁎⁎
Qualification level:
Qual. High 0.106 0.073 ⁎ 0.206 0.079 ⁎⁎⁎
Qual. Med.-High
Qual. Medium-Low 0.038 0.054 ⁎ −0.012 −0.065 ⁎
Qual. Low −0.220 0.054 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.046 0.060 ⁎
Type of contract:
Permanent contract
Permanent per task −0.196 0.124 1.463 0.114 ⁎⁎⁎
Temporary 0.265 0.070 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.634 0.095 ⁎⁎⁎
Other type 0.065 0.104 ⁎ 0.877 0.117 ⁎⁎⁎
Firm size:
b 10 employees
N10 and b 50 employees 0.006 0.044 0.229 0.050 ⁎⁎⁎
N50 and b 200 employees 0.103 0.049 ⁎⁎ 0.512 0.054 ⁎⁎⁎
N200 and b 1000 employees 0.081 0.058 0.625 0.062 ⁎⁎⁎
N1000 employees −0.035 0.078 0.882 0.078 ⁎⁎⁎
Tenure In previous job:
b 4 weeks
N4 weeks and b 20 weeks 0.423 0.048 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.103 0.052 ⁎⁎
N20 weeks and b 1 year 0.571 0.055 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.603 0.057 ⁎⁎⁎
N1 year and b 2 years 0.564 0.078 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.014 0.100
N2 years 0.626 0.098 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.468 0.154 ⁎⁎⁎
Worked in a Temporary Help Agency 0.445 0.081 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.065 0.102
Unemployment benefit status:
Receives no benefits
Contributory benefits −0.395 0.065 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.475 0.081 ⁎⁎⁎
Assistance benefits −0.509 0.081 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.838 0.088 ⁎⁎⁎
Month ⁎ Contributory benefits −0.021 0.012 ⁎ −0.042 0.021 ⁎⁎
Number of previous jobs 0.145 0.012 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.173 0.012 ⁎⁎⁎
Regional Unemployment rate (tvc) 0.030 0.013 ⁎⁎ −0.049 0.014 ⁎⁎⁎
(continued on next page)
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benefit differs in magnitude among workers who were recalled. Compared to workers who do not
receive benefits, those who receive assistance (contributory) benefits are 58 (33) per cent less likely to
be recalled. Assistance benefit is typically received by workers with low worker-firm attachment.
Table 5 (continued )
WOMEN
Dif. Emp Recall
Coef. S.E. Sign. Coef. S.E. Sign.
Sector of activity:
Industry
Agriculture 0.844 0.279 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.174 −0.281
Construction −0.453 0.105 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.677 0.102 ⁎⁎⁎
Services 0.118 0.057 ⁎⁎ −0.313 0.058 ⁎⁎⁎
Mass points and probability:
ε1 (s.e.) −4.773(0.209)⁎⁎⁎
ε2 (s.e.) −2.918(0.173)⁎⁎⁎
Pr(ε1) 0.152
Pr(ε2) 0.848
No. Observations 62,908
Log-likelihood −33,047.64
Note: See note Table 3.Thus, this result is consistent with the existence of implicit contracts between firms and UI recipients:
workers with above-average attachment are recalled faster by the firm that laid them off.
Since the Spanish unemployment insurance system provides benefits for a limited time and in
a declining fashion, we have included in the specification an interaction term between receipt of
contributory benefits and months of unemployment. This allows us to capture possible variation
of the coefficient on the dummy for unemployment benefit status along the unemployment spell.
We obtain that the disincentive effect of benefits falls with duration of unemployment. Therefore,
the unemployed worker usually suffers liquidity constraints and becomes less selective about job
opportunities as their spells of unemployment lengthen (Katz and Meyer, 1990; Van den Berg,
1990; Narendranathan et. al., 1993; Dormont et al., 2001; Jenkins and García-Serrano, 2004).
Regional labour market conditions are controlled for in the regression by including each region's
quarterly unemployment rate as a time varying covariate. Also, regional dummies are included (not
reported). As expected, a higher regional unemployment rate is associated with a lower exit rate from
unemployment. This negative impact of the regional unemployment rate on the exit rate is stronger for
the recall alternative. However, regional dummies are still quite significant. The use of recall seems to
be more common in Andalusia and Extremadura, which are regions with unemployment rates above
the national average.
We now consider the issue of duration dependence of the hazard rates that result from estimating
the competing risks model for the two alternatives of leaving unemployment. Fig. 1 shows the
estimated hazard rate, after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, at mean of covariates for the
entire sample. Because we already know that the unemployment hazard rate through recall is lower
than the unemployment hazard rate into a new job, we are interested here in the shape of theses
hazards. The predicted hazards that result from the estimation of our competing risks model exhibit
quite different shapes.We could say that apart from drops in moths 4th, 7th and 14th, the recall hazard
rate exhibits no duration dependence. On the other hand, the estimated hazard for exit into a new job is
virtually flat until the 10th month, and presents positive duration dependence thereafter.
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In essence, at short unemployment durations, profiles are rather similar for both types of exits;
however, for long unemployment durations, the estimated new-job hazard is clearly upward slopping
whereas the recall hazard levels off. This reflects the fact that in the beginning of the unemployment
Fig. 1. The shape of the estimated hazard rate from unemployment into recall or different employer (after controlling
unobserved heterogeneity) at the mean of covariates.spell, workers expected to be recalled do little search for a new job. Since firms cannot immediately
determine whether downturns are transitory or permanent, the longer a low demand state lasts, the
more likely it will become a “permanent” low demand state. As a consequence, the longer a worker
remains on layoff, the lower his perceived instantaneous recall probability. Thiswill induce a declining
reservation wage. Thus, revised expectations of the recall probability result in increased search
activity, which increases the new job hazard rate. These results are quite consistent with expectations
arising from both contract and search models (Mavromaras and Orme, 2004, pp. 52). An additional
interpretation can be given from the demand-side of the labour market: as the employer's option of
reemploying workers on temporary layoff weakens with unemployment duration, he/she will try to
recall workers as earlier as possible (Katz, 1986; Katz and Meyer, 1990), that is, as soon as demand
conditions are again favourable.
Fig. 2 shows the estimated duration dependence for UI and UA recipients separately. This
figure shows the estimated hazard rate (after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity) at mean of
covariates for UI and UA recipients. We observe that the new job hazard rates are above the
estimated recall hazard rates for both types of recipients. Nevertheless, the UI hazard rates (for
both new and recall jobs) are larger than those of UA recipients. Thus, expected unemployment
duration of UA recipients is larger than that of UI recipients. Notice that the mobility pattern of
both recipients for each outcome is similar to that in Fig. 1, since hazard rates are evaluated at
mean of covariates. Thus, the recall hazard rate basically exhibits no duration-dependence, while
the estimated hazard for new jobs presents no duration-dependence up to the 10th month and
positive duration dependence thereafter.
Having also estimated separatemodels formen andwomen,we present the results in Tables 4 and 5,
respectively. Some noteworthy differences are observed in the impact of some independent variables
according to gender. As regards age, we find that women follow a pattern similar to that of the entire
sample: compared to the 30-39 age group, younger women aremuchmore likely to find a new job and
elder women are more likely to be recalled. However, only men below 30 years-old are clearly
different from the others in that they appear much less likely to be recalled. Both men and women
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experiment a positive impact on the likelihood of being recalled from the fact of holding a high
qualification level, but only the latter suffer a negative impact on finding a new job from holding a low
qualification level. Estimated results by gender as regards the remainder explanatory variables (type of
Fig. 2. The shape of the estimated hazard rate from unemployment into recall or different employer (after controlling
unobserved heterogeneity) at the mean of covariates, by type of benefit recipients.contract, tenure in the previous job, firm size, employed via a THA, unemployment benefit status and
number of previous jobs) do not substantially differ from those obtained for the entire sample.
Finally, Fig. 3 shows the pattern of duration dependence by gender (after controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity) at mean of covariates. As previously discussed for the entire sample,
the hazard rate from unemployment into a new job keeps over the hazard rate from unemployment
through recall. Furthermore, the recall hazard rate (which is larger for females) exhibits no
duration dependence, while the estimated hazard for new jobs (which is larger for males) presents
positive duration dependence.
5. Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have analysed transitions out of unemployment in Spain.We have considered two
alternative ways of becoming employed: recall by the previous employer or reemployment in a new
job. The data set used has been generated by combining Social Security and unemployment benefit
records produced by the Spanish Employment Office. It contains information about worker job
characteristics before and after the unemployment begins, as well as the dates of start and end of every
spell of employment from June 1999 to June 2002.Using these rich data, we have estimated a discrete-
time duration model with competing risks of exits to a recall or a new job. In such model, duration
dependence is accounted for through the use of a semi-parametric piecewise constant hazard
estimation, and unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. This is the first article that addresses
the study of transitions out of unemployment (via recall or new job) using the referred data and
methodology for Spain.
The coefficients obtained by variables related to personal characteristics indicate that the
probability of being recalled is higher for women, older people and for higher qualified persons (who
are presumably in possession of larger specific human capital). Concerning job characteristics,
workers are more likely to be recalled in the following cases: 1) held a permanent per task or fixed-
term contract; 2) stayed in the previous job between 20 weeks and 1 year; 3) their job was in the
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industry sector; 4) were employed by a large firm. In contrast, men, young workers (below 35 years-
old) and those working via a temporary help agency enjoy a higher likelihood of exiting from
unemployment into a new job.We also find a positive influence of previous employment experiences
Fig. 3. The shape of the estimated hazard rate from unemployment into recall or different employer (after controlling
unobserved heterogeneity) at the mean of covariates, by gender.on future new jobs: the longer the job stability experienced by workers in previous employment
engagements, the higher the exit rate from unemployment into a new job.
Another important result is that not only do individual and job characteristics influence the
hazard rates differently, but also that the duration dependence is different according to the route of
exiting unemployment. The recall hazard rate basically exhibits no duration dependence, while
the estimated hazard for new jobs shows no duration dependence until the 10th month and
positive duration dependence, thereafter. Finally, as regards the effect of contributory and
assistance benefits, non-claimants exit from unemployment faster than claimants do.
Nevertheless, while the disincentive effect of the two types of benefits is similar in magnitude
for the unemployed who entered into a new job, the negative effect for recall workers is stronger
for those holding assistance benefits rather than contributory benefits.
The empirical findings in this paper establish that recall to the former employer and, therefore,
temporary job separations constitute an important feature of the Spanish labour market. Therefore, to
adequately investigate transitions out of unemployment in Spain we need to consider the recall
outcome. It also helps to understand the nature of unemployment itself. Lack of experience rating and
demand fluctuations provide strong incentives for implicit contracts. The pervasive use of fixed-term
contracts is a reflection of those incentives. When a fixed-term contract ends (as opposed to a
permanent contract), often no particular cost arises for the employer, and the Spanish Public
Employment System has no means of determining whether non-renewal of the contract has the
character of likely recall in the future. In this setting, unemployment benefit entitlements, therefore,
may create incentives for employers to offer fixed-term rather than permanent contracts, and to play
with the recall probability. A labour market reform that pursues the reduction of temporary
employment in Spain needs to make sequential contracting of the same workers less attractive, for
both the employer and the worker.
Moreover, our results are also relevant for the design of active labour market policies. It is clear
that the public employment service must consider workers waiting to be recalled lees needed of
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employment services, particularly job search assistance. This will reduce the dead weight
generally associated with active labour market measures. However, workers who fail to fulfil their
expectation of recall could have trouble leaving unemployment if they have made no effort to find
a new job. This possibility needs also to be considered.
Given the empirical findings in this paper, there is a risk that UI benefits will artificially subsidise
the regular use of temporary layoffs. That is, possibly collusive behaviour for taking advantage of the
unemployment compensation system may make implicit contracts of this sort attractive for both
workers and firms. In essence, benefit administrators need to assess the frequency of benefit
claimants associated with temporary layoffs that seem to have no real insurance function, and the
effectiveness of measures to limit them. These issues remain open for future research.
Appendix A
Table A.1
Occupation category groups
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201 224.3. Chief and departmental heads.Upper-Intermediate Occupation 4. Other semi-skilled workers.
5. Skilled clerks.
6. Auxiliary workers.Lower-Intermediate Occupation 7. Semi-skilled clerks.
8. Skilled labourers.
9. Semi-skilled labourers
10. Unskilled labourers.Table A.2
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